

# SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING FOR DISASTER REDUCTION AND POST- FUKUSHIMA RECOMMENDATIONS

Presented to the SDR

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# Contents

2

- Introduction to the Commission
- Overview of Nuclear Power Plants (NPP)
  - ▣ Location
  - ▣ Design Requirements
- NPP Consequences
- Fukushima Dai-ichi Event
- NRC Actions




3

# Nuclear Regulatory Commission





# U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission



November 01 2010

## Nuclear Regulatory Research




5

# Overview of NPPs


# Map of Operating Nuclear Power Reactors

6



▲ Licensed to Operate (104)

# Map of Proposed New Nuclear Power Reactors



You may click on a design name to view the NRC's Web site for the specific design.

● ABWR   
 ■ AP1000   
 + EPR   
 ▲ ESBWR   
 ◆ USAPWR   
 ▽ Design/Units - TBA

# General Facts

8

- 104 units at 65 sites in 31 states
  - ▣ 20% of Nation's electricity
  - ▣ 70 have undergone license renewal
  - ▣ New designs and operating licenses under review
- Among the most hardened commercial facilities in the world
  - ▣ Including robust guard forces
- Designs are based on a defense in depth concept
  - ▣ Internal and external hazards



# Defense in Depth

9

- Multiple independent and redundant layers of defense to compensate for hazards, failures or errors so that no layer is exclusively relied on
  - ▣ protection, mitigation and emergency preparedness
- Protection against internal, external and security related events
- Mitigation- hardened safety systems
  - ▣ Robust containment structure
  - ▣ Post 9/11 requirements
- Emergency preparedness
  - ▣ Evacuation plans
  - ▣ Sheltering/Potassium Iodide (KI)
  - ▣ Return criteria



# External Hazards

10

- Natural phenomena suited to the specific site
  - ▣ Floods, seismic, tsunami, seiches, hurricane, tornado
  - ▣ Maximum historical values (deterministic)
  - ▣ Additional margin
- NRC is now using PRA
  - ▣ Seismic design basis ground motion determined so that  $1E-6$  CDF



# Wolf Creek Containment Construction

11



# Trojan and Ginna Containments

12



# Beyond Design Basis Considerations

13

- Use of PRA has resulted in additional requirements
  - Low frequency/high consequence events
  - Loss of all ac power (station blackout, SBO)
  - Anticipated transient without SCRAM
  - Severe accident management strategies
  - Hydrogen control
  - Aircraft impact - **extensive damage mitigation**

# PRA and Consequences

14

- WASH-1400
  - Published in 1975
  - First application of PRA to NPPs
- NUREG-1150
  - Published in 1990 (just internal events)
  - LCF individual  $\sim 2E-9$  within 10 miles; absolute prompt fatalities  $\sim 10$
- Sandia Siting Study
  - Published in 1982
  - To support rulemaking
  - LCF individual  $\sim 1E-7$  within 10 miles; abs. prompt fatalities  $\sim 100$
- State of the Art Consequence Analysis
  - Public comment expected in December 2011
  - Best estimate
  - LCF individual  $\sim 1E-10$  within 10 miles ; absolute prompt fatalities  $\sim 0$ 
    - Return modeled


15

# Fukushima Dai-ichi



# Sequence of Events


16



[www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/meetings/PDFplus/2011/cn200/documentation/cn200\\_Final-Fukushima-Mission\\_Report.pdf](http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/meetings/PDFplus/2011/cn200/documentation/cn200_Final-Fukushima-Mission_Report.pdf)



# Fukushima Unit 4




# Radioactivity Releases

18

- Dai-ichi Emergency Worker Dose Limits
  - 200 milliSieverts (mSv) = 20 Rem
- Plant workers
  - Six people exceeded the dose limit
  - 250 mSv = 25 Rem
  - Occupations
    - Operators
    - Engineers
- No health consequences have been noted
- LNT 2.5% above LCF background


# Dose Rate Map

19



## explanatory note

Air dose rate over 1 meter above ground level ( $\mu\text{Sv/hr}$ )  
 [Converted into the value as of July 2]



20

# NRC Actions

# NRC Response to Events in Japan

21

- NRC conducted a methodical and systematic review
  
- Near-term actions
  - ▣ Conducted additional inspections regarding coping measures
  
- Near Term Task Force Report
  - ▣ 12 Recommended Actions
    - 2 for NRC
    - 6 for industry
    - 4 Longer-term actions



<http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1118/ML111861807.pdf>

# Recommendations Summary

22

- No imminent risk from continued operation and continued licensing activities
- NRC's regulatory framework could be enhanced
- Additional requirements and nuclear power plant improvements for low probability, high consequence events, would reduce risk even further

# Interim Actions

23

- The near-term actions identified are the following:
  - Seismic and flood hazard reevaluations
  - Seismic and flood walkdowns
  - Station blackout regulatory actions
  - Equipment covered under Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) 50.54(hh)(2)
  - Reliable hardened vents for Mark I containments
  - Strengthening and integration
    - emergency operating procedures,
    - severe accident management guidelines, and
    - extensive damage mitigation

# Next Steps

24

- Notation vote paper due October 3, 2011
  - Reflect regulatory actions
  - Implementation challenges
  - Technical and regulatory basis
  - Additional recommendations
  - Schedule and milestones for stakeholder engagement and Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards review



# Summary

25

- Nuclear power plant landscape
- Robust infrastructure
  - ▣ Defense in Depth
  - ▣ Design for internal and external hazards
- Fukushima Daiichi event
- Task Force Recommendations

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26

# QUESTIONS

